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A B S T R A C T
While contemporary technological disruption is increasingly conceptualized in terms of the logic and paradoxes
of the digital platform economy, discussions of “FinTech” have only engaged to a limited extent with these
debates—particularly from an economic geographic standpoint. Here we fill this gap by proposing an adapted
Global Financial Network (GFN) framework for conceptualizing the organizational and geographic logic of the
digital platform economy in finance, and applying it to examine the impact of the digital platform model on asset
management. As we will show, asset management is being profoundly disrupted by what we dub digital asset
management platforms—or DAMPs—which encompass services including index fund and ETF provision, robo-
advising, and analytics and trading support. Like other digital platforms, DAMPs do not so much leverage
technology to enhance their competitiveness within markets, as to radically restructure the market itself. Also,
like other platforms, their rise has produced a winner-take-all paradox of centralization through democratization
that defies predictions of technology-enabled industry decentralization. However, the logic and implications of
the rise of DAMPs diverges, in other respects, from non-financial digital platforms, as finance has long possessed
an informational intensity and regulatory and organizational fluidity characteristic of the digital platform
economy. Consequently, the digital platform model has mostly developed endogenously in asset management
through incremental innovation by major financial firms—in a process that has reinforced the position of leading
incumbent asset management centers, and above all New York—rather than being introduced from the outside
by upstart technology firms and clusters.
“[BlackRock's Aladdin] has within its memory a vast history of the past
50 years - not just financial - but all kinds of events. What it does is
constantly take things that happen in the present day and compares them
to events in the past. Out of the millions and millions of correlations -
Aladdin then spots possible disasters - possible futures - and moves the
investments to avoid that future happening. I can't over-emphasise how
powerful Blackrock's system is in shaping the world - it's more powerful in
some respects than traditional politics…But it's boring. And there is no
story. Just patterns…It is the modern world of power - and it's incredibly
boring. Nothing to film, run by a cautious man who is in no way a wolf of
Wall Street. It's how power works today. It hides in plain sight - through
sheer boringness and dullness.” – Adam Curtis
1. Introduction
From the invention of writing, to Nathan Rothschild’s apocryphal
carrier pigeons, the financial sector has always been a precocious
adopter of information and communications technology. In 1837, one
French deputy declared that “I have never seen telegraphic lines es-
tablished by private persons with good intentions'; they serve to 'es-
tablish a brigandage, so as to rob those who do not have news of the
Paris Bourse” (Flichy, 1993). However, there is a growing sense of a
new era of technological disruption in finance, with two narratives now
particularly prominent. The first is disruptive automation; one study
suggests that 23% of financial analyst, and 58% of financial advisor jobs
may be lost in the near future (Frey and Osborne, 2017). The second is
disruptive decentralization, with three notable subcomponents. Firstly,
at the firm level, incumbent giants are expected to be brought down by
swarms of innovative “FinTech” start-ups (Arner et al., 2016). Mean-
while, geographically, incumbent financial centers (e.g. Wall Street)
will be hollowed-out by competition with upstart, tech-savvy locales
(Tett, 2018). Finally, with respect to governance, regulators will be
outflanked by the institutions of “Web 3.0”—e.g. decentralized block-
chain ledgers (Economist, 2018a; Swan, 2015).
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In general, these narratives are uncannily reminiscent of the utopian
(or dystopian) predictions of the early days of the internet; or in the
case of automation, more longstanding predictions about the ob-
solescence of work. As noted by the Economist (2018b), the internet has
not only failed to bear out early predictions of a decentralized, liber-
tarian “flat world,” but has largely led to the opposite outcome, wherein
a growing number of industries are controlled by massive monopolistic
firms, which are based in a handful of elite locations, serve as agents of
unprecedentedly pervasive regimes of state surveillance and control,
and have catalyzed an explosion of low-paid menial work in the “gig”
economy.
At the center of this paradox is a business model dubbed the “digital
platform economy” (Kenney and Zysman, 2016; Evans and Gawer,
2016; Langley and Leyshon, 2017). Notably, for all of the analyses of
the impact of new technologies in finance; and of the digital platform
economy outside of finance; there has not been a systematic evaluation
of the impact of the digital platform model on asset management. Here
we fill this gap, by (1) building a modified Global Financial Network
(GFN) framework for conceptualizing the organizational and geo-
graphic logic of the digital platform economy in finance, and (2) ex-
amining the deepening impact of the digital platform model on asset
management.
As we will show, asset management is being profoundly disrupted
by the rise of what we dub digital asset management platforms—or
DAMPs—which encompass a vertically integrated set of services ran-
ging from index fund and ETF provision, to robo-advising, to third-
party analytics and trading support. Like other digital platforms,
DAMPs do not so much leverage technology to enhance their compe-
titiveness within markets, as to radically restructure the market itself.
Moreover, as for other platforms, their rise has been associated with a
paradox of centralization through democratization, wherein reductions
in customer costs are counterintuitively coupled to oligopoly or
monopoly. However, we also show that the peculiar characteristics of
the financial sector—and above all, the extent to which it already re-
sembles the digital platform economy in its informational intensity, and
organizational and regulatory fluidity—have led to differences in the
logic and implications of the rise of DAMPs, in comparison to other
industries. In particular, DAMPs (1) have tended to asymmetrically
disrupt different dimensions of market efficiency,1 (2) are generally less
suited to regulatory arbitrage than other tools already at the disposal of
financial firms, and (3) have mostly reinforced rather than challenged
the position of incumbent asset management firms and centers.
The remainder of the paper is divided into eight sections. In section
two we review the digital platform economy, before examining in
section three how its logic interacts with the unique characteristics of
the financial sector. From a geographic standpoint, we propose an
adapted version of Coe et al.’s (2014) Global Financial Network (GFN)
framework for problematizing the deepening impact of information
technology on finance. Next, in section four, we examine the business
models of the most important DAMPs, before demonstrating, in section
five, how these have produced a classic digital platform paradox of
centralization through democratization. In sections six, seven, and eight
we probe the geographic dimensions of the rise of DAMPs, before
concluding with a discussion of the broader implications of this busi-
ness model in asset management and finance.
2. The digital platform economy
There is a growing awareness that the information age economy is
dominated by a specific organizational form, dubbed the “digital plat-
form economy” (Kenney and Zysman, 2016; Evans and Gawer, 2016;
Langley and Leyshon, 2017). The digital platform economy can be
conceptualized as a collection of technology-enabled hub-and-spokes
business models, wherein a platform-providing lead firm coordinates
the activities of platform users. As noted by Evans and Gawer (2016),
there are two basic types of digital platform. The first (e.g. operating
systems) establish a core of tools and standards that serve as a foun-
dation for third-party software or content. Meanwhile, the second es-
tablish a marketplace wherein various categories of user transact with
one another, and/or the platform provider itself.
The line between these platform types is blurry. Broadly speaking,
however, it is the second that has been associated with the “disruption”
of traditionally non-ICT-centered industries, including advertising, taxi
service, accommodation, and retail. This disruption generally follows a
stereotyped pattern, wherein the cost of a goods or service is dramati-
cally reduced through some mixture of both technology-enabled effi-
ciency enhancement, and technology-enabled organizational arbitrage.
Firstly, the disruptive potential of platforms typically stems from
their enhancement of market “efficiency,” such that incumbent inter-
mediaries or participants are rendered obsolete (Langley and Leyshon,
2017).2 Platforms typically boost multiple dimensions of efficiency in a
complementary manner (Edelman and Geradin, 2015), with an em-
phasis on “allocative efficiency”—i.e. setting prices at a market-clearing
rate with respect to supply and demand— “informational effi-
ciency”—i.e. the extent to which prices reflect informed assessments
and expectations of the past, present, and future—and finally what
Tobin (1984) dubs market “functional efficiency”—i.e. the overhead
costs of the pricing process compared to the socio-economic value it
provides. At the center of the enhancement of all three, for most plat-
forms, are “big-data”-fed analytics. In online advertising for example,
this entails analyzing user data to determine exactly how much a user’s
clicks/views are worth to whom in any given context, thus ensuring
optimal advertising spending allocation. Automation of the whole
process drives costs to the lowest possible level. Also important to
market efficiency enhancement, for many platforms, is intensified
producer competition enabled by reduced market entry barriers. Ride-
sharing services, for example, optimize supply-demand matching not
only by calculating exactly how much rides should cost in a particular
time and place (e.g. “surge pricing”), but by enabling individuals to
become drivers (Edelman and Geradin, 2015).
Platforms nearly always provide some genuine technology-enabled
market “efficiency” enhancement. However, platform competitiveness
also typically rests, at least partially, on technology-enabled organiza-
tional arbitrage; usually made possible by the control that platform
providers gain over markets in the process of enhancing their efficiency
(Edelman and Geradin, 2015; Langley and Leyshon, 2017). Most im-
portantly, providers are typically able to externalize various costs to
users. Often, this is done by harvesting users’ “digital labor” (or “digital
exhaust”) (Fumagalli et al., 2018; Neef, 2014). In other cases (e.g. the
“gig” economy), platform providers serve as brokers coordinating the
delivery of paid services, meaning that customer income cannot simply
be pocketed without compensating producers. Even here, however,
providers typically externalize the largest possible component of cost-
s—usually by leveraging platform control to blur the boundary between
market and hierarchical coordination (e.g. reclassifying employment-
like relations as subcontracting). This often entails a business model
predicated on arbitraging labor and other regulations, with the spread
of digital platforms thus a legally and politically contentious process
(Davies et al., 2017; Edelman and Geradin, 2015).
Taken as a whole, digital platforms have pushed the information
economy in counterintuitive directions—particularly when viewed
against the rather utopian predictions of the early internet era. On the
one hand, their rise has intensified the paradox noted by Lessig (2006),
1 Specifically “information-arbitrage,” “fundamental valuation” and “func-
tional” efficiency (Tobin, 1984).
2 According to Langley and Leyshon (2017), “The underlying intermediary
logic of the platform is that it solves coordination problems in market exchange
by extending the distance-shrinking networking capacities of the internet.”
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wherein the very features of cyberspace that make it resistant to state
regulatory authority—namely its organizational and geographic slip-
periness—have encouraged the emergence of countervailing “sover-
eigns of everywhere,” with an increasingly pervasive and intrusive
reach. Meanwhile, even more striking is what can be dubbed the digital
platform paradox of centralization through democratization (Acquier
et al., 2017; Langley and Leyshon, 2017). Platforms are democratizing
insofar as they offer reduced costs and increased convenience for cus-
tomers, and/or lower entry barriers for producers. However, they also
create new privately-controlled market choke points, with a “winner-
take-all” concentration of market share at the level of platform provi-
ders typically fostered by powerful interlocking increasing returns
(Economist, 2018c). First are “network effects” wherein new users
further enhance platform attractiveness to other users. Second are data-
based returns to scale, wherein “More information lets firms develop
better services, which attracts more users, which in-turn generate more
data” (Economist, 2018d). Third are conventional scale economies
stemming from the predominantly fixed cost structure of platforms
(itself often a product of how providers can pick and choose which costs
to internalize versus externalize to users). Crucially, the paradox of
centralization through democratization also operates geographically,
with the “superstar effect” in knowledge-driven industries more often
exacerbating regional inequalities than creating an ICT-enabled level
competitive playing field (Davies et al., 2017; Quah, 1996).
3. Finance as a digital platform industry: A global financial
network perspective
Our argument is that technological disruption in finance is in-
creasingly converging on the digital platform model. However, finance
has unusual characteristics that have caused this to occur in a different
manner from other industries. Ironically, these differences stem from
the extent to which two key features of the digital platform economy
have always been central to finance; namely its informational intensity,
and regulatory and organizational fluidity.
Firstly, harnessing the power of “big data” to maximize market ef-
ficiency is more evolutionary than revolutionary in finance. Indeed,
gathering and processing market information has always been the in-
dustry’s lifeblood (Wójcik, 2011). From the standpoint of digital plat-
form development, what is most important is that the financial sector’s
massive existing apparatus of information gathering and processing
has, as noted by Tobin (1984), long produced a sharply asymmetrical
development of different aspects of market “efficiency”—particularly in
the securities market. Firstly, from an informational standpoint, fi-
nancial markets tend to be characterized by much higher “information
arbitrage efficiency” than “fundamental valuation efficiency.” “In-
formation arbitrage efficiency” is high in the sense that the market is so
overcrowded with investors seeking to identify and exploit opportu-
nities for pricing arbitrage, that it becomes difficult for anyone to
consistently outsmart the market consensus. However, this does not
mean that the consensus itself is particularly good at anticipating and
pricing future events—as evidenced by volatility levels far in excess of
changes in underlying fundamentals (Schiller, 2003; Tobin, 1994). In-
deed, the same liquidity that enables “information arbitrage efficiency”
may undermine “fundamental valuation efficiency” by facilitating
speculative manias and other pathologies.
Also very low, Tobin argues, is the “functional efficiency” of fi-
nancial markets, as defined by the extent to which their operational
costs (salaries, profits, etc.) are justified by the services they perform.
From Tobin’s standpoint, the key question is value to society. However,
finance’s “functional efficiency” is arguably also quite low for market
participants. Indeed, as for fundamental valuation efficiency, low
functional efficiency appears to be a counterintuitive corollary of high
information arbitrage efficiency, as the same overcrowding of securities
markets that allows for information to be rapidly incorporated into
prices undermines the ability of participants to make money (see
Section 4). There is overwhelming evidence that nearly all fund man-
agers underperform market average indices once operational costs are
deducted (Malkiel, 2013).
Taken as a whole, these disconnects between different aspects of
financial market “efficiency” imply that the conventional digital plat-
form pattern of disrupting industries by simultaneously boosting all
aspects of market efficiency, in a complementary manner, is unlikely to
find much purchase in finance. Rather, platforms are likely to operate
asymmetrically on different aspects of efficiency.
Just as striking as the parallels between the informational intensity
of the digital platform economy, and finance as traditionally structured,
are their parallel organizational and geographic fluidity. The activities
of financial firms, like digital platform providers, are enormously con-
sequential for the “real” economy. However, the products directly
provided by both are mostly constituted, in a literal sense, of abstract
textual and numerical “code.” Of primary importance in finance are
private contracts (Haberly and Wójcik, 2017a; Knuth and Potts, 2015;
Pistor, 2013). Like software, these contracts can, at least in common-
law based systems, be crafted in almost unlimited innovative ways so
long as they remain within the bounds of public law and reg-
ulation—which are themselves mutable via choice of jurisdictional
arena and political lobbying. The result is a deep structural common-
ality between the dialectics of legal-regulatory innovation/avoidance/
mobility, and state regulatory response, in finance and cyberspace
(Ferri and Minsky, 1992; Lessig, 2006); however a commonality in
which Silicon Valley, for all of its recent controversies, is an amateur
when compared to Wall Street or The City. The question this raises is
whether the emergence of a new financial technological architecture
will have any impact on the basic logic of this dialectic of regulatory
avoidance and reaction, or simply define a new chapter in an old story.
Crucially, none of these questions can be addressed in a geographic
vacuum. As financial geographers have long observed, the informa-
tional efficiency of financial markets must be generated by the human
and material apparatus of financial centers (Cook et al., 2007; Wójcik,
2011; Zook and Grote, 2017). The key question is how the “old”
human-relational informational geography of finance will interact with
its increasingly important “new” virtual informational geography—and
just as importantly, the geography of behind-the-scenes technicians
who craft its algorithms. Similarly, geographers (e.g. Roberts, 1994;
Coe et al., 2014; Haberly and Wójcik, 2017a; Knuth and Potts, 2015)
have long emphasized that the abstract legal-regulatory dimension of
finance must be structured through real places—even if only law offices
housing the documentation of “brass plate” companies. In this respect,
the key question is how this “paper” geography of finance will interact
with the growing importance of its “virtual” geography.
Addressing these questions requires an analytical framework that
conceptualizes the evolution of financial geographies in terms of the
intersection of multiple, qualitatively different geographic logics, rather
than simply an overarching logic of financial center agglomeration. The
outline of such an approach is provided by the Global Financial
Network (GFN) framework introduced by Coe et al. (2014), which
conceptualizes the geography of finance as a multidimensional logic of
financial center specialization across different functional spheres. As
has been widely acknowledged (see Töpfer, 2018; Wójcik, 2018), this
framework is something of an initial sketch, which requires elaboration
to be fully operationalized. Consequently, in Fig. 1, we outline an ex-
panded GFN approach to conceptualizing the geographic evolution of
FinTech. In contrast to Coe et al.’s “2D”-framework, this problematizes
financial geographies in terms of the four-pronged interactions between
what we dub the “relational,” “virtual,” “technical,” and “paper” geo-
graphies of finance. Each sphere has its own logic of centripetal and
centrifugal processes—both internally and in relation to other spher-
es—which are seen as combining to condition the role and formation of
particular financial centers.
Implicit in this framework is the potential for a technology-enabled
centrifugal unbundling of the geography of finance. In the most extreme
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scenario, incumbent global financial market clearinghouses and com-
mand centers might be rendered obsolete by the rise of four-pronged
decentralized networks. In these networks, the core market informa-
tional processing functions of finance would increasingly be performed
by computerized data centers located wherever land and energy are
cheapest (see Jaeger et al., 2009). Meanwhile, human labor would in-
creasingly be bifurcated between back-office technical and front-office
client relational roles. In theory, neither need be located near each
other, nor near data centers. Technical jobs might gravitate towards
“back-office technology centers,” with Silicon Valley (and its interna-
tional low-wage offshoots) perhaps “eating” the bulk of financial in-
dustry employment and value. Meanwhile, the remaining relational
roles in finance might be dispersed to “regional market centers” em-
bedded within locally specific bodies of knowledge and relationships
(see Dixon and Monk, 2014).
Finally, the “paper” organization of financial vehicles and contracts
need not correspond to any of these three layers, but rather might reside
in an offshore network offering maximum legal and regulatory flex-
ibility. As financial activity becomes increasingly “virtual,” onshore
jurisdictional connecting factors might be severed by financial “data
havens”—i.e. offshore jurisdictions which attract electronic
transactions and record-keeping (Jaeger et al., 2009). As shown in
Fig. 2, the British Virgin Islands and Seychelles already have far more
servers per capita than any other countries/jurisdictions. Several off-
shore jurisdictions are jostling to become cryptocurrency hubs (Kahn,
2015).
Some elements of this scenario of technologically-driven financial
geographic unbundling are clearly unfolding. However, there is reason
to believe that it is unlikely to progress to extremity, due to the op-
eration of countervailing centripetal forces both within and between
each of the four functional spheres in Fig. 1. Firstly, the “virtual” geo-
graphy of financial market information processing is less unmoored
from the traditional “relational” geography of financial centers than
might be expected (Wójcik, 2011; Zook and Grote, 2017). For trading,
the information technology-enabled acceleration of transaction pace
has more than canceled-out any communications technology-enabled
compression of distance, with trader servers clustering near securities
exchanges to gain a fleeting advantage in signal travel time. From both
a human and machine standpoint, these locations—which we dub
“global exchange hubs” in Fig. 1—remain the leading global financial
command centers. For the most part, these are the same places that
have long been dominant in this respect (e.g. New York, London); in-
deed, as detailed by Wójcik (2011), technology has overwhelmingly
promoted a further concentration of securities market activity—both
human and electronic—in already dominant centers. To the extent that
spatial diffusion occurs, it appears to be largely within these exchange
hubs, with activities sprawling outwards from traditional financial
districts into ever-larger global financial city-regions (e.g. Mahwah, NJ
and Stamford, CT are respectively the centers of exchange/trader ser-
vers and hedge fund management for New York).
Meanwhile, the space for an unbundling of the “paper” offshore
legal-regulatory geography of finance from the “real” geography of fi-
nancial centers is narrowing. Decades of efforts to combat offshore tax
and regulatory arbitrage by expanding the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of onshore states have increasingly forced offshore centers to operate
with one (or both) feet inside of onshore regulatory frameworks
(Roberts, 1994; Haberly and Wójcik, 2017a). In the most extreme case,
the Chinese government has directly undertaken the construction and
operation of offshore state-owned enterprise listing and RMB trading
facilities (Hall, 2017; Wójcik and Camilleri, 2015). More broadly, for
prudential regulation, the Basel framework has tackled Euromarket
arbitrage by assigning global supervision of multinational banks to the
home states where they are headquartered (D’Hulster, 2012). Mean-
while, securities regulatory jurisdiction (particularly for the US) is in-
creasingly defined substantively based on to and by whom and where
securities are promoted, traded, and sold, with paper vehicle domicile
of decreasing relevance (Chang, 2003; Haberly and Wójcik, 2017a).
Finally, political pressure on tax havens has prompted firms to seek
Fig. 1. Modified Global Financial Network (GFN) Framework.
Fig. 2. Servers Per Million Inhabitants, 2017.
Source: World Bank.
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plausible deniability by using larger (e.g. OECD) havens (Economist,
2013a). As shown in Fig. 1, the paper geography of finance thus re-
mains anchored by what can be dubbed “legal-regulatory hubs” located
within the dominant traditional financial centers—and above all the
leading “global exchange hubs.” This is not just a public regulatory
issue, but also entangled with the role of these centers as hubs for
private contractual law, wherein jurisdictional reputation and accu-
mulated legal precedent are of paramount importance. Indeed, the most
influential legal frameworks (e.g. New York) provide the basis for
global financial law export industries (Knuth and Potts, 2015).
Finally, the “technical” and “relational” geographies of finance are
entangled with both one another and the “paper” geography of finance.
Regardless of whether humans are removed from directly performing
activities (e.g. stock-picking), the technical side of finance must be
embedded in higher-order sector-specific skills and strategy, responsive
to a rapidly changing competitive landscape. It is unclear whether
“back-office technology-centers” can, regardless of software expertise,
compete with established financial centers in these respects.
Particularly notable is that financial innovation must, regardless of
technological content, involve “paper” contractual innovation requiring
a deep expertise in relevant areas of law and regulation (see Haberly
and Wójcik, 2017a). This entails not only familiarity with current
regulation, but also expertise and investment in the type of sustained
political engagement necessary to shape regulation. Notably, most of
the largest Silicon Valley firms, including Google and Amazon, have so
far been deterred from entering financial services by the unfamiliar and
high-risk regulatory complexities this would entail (Willmer and
Kumar, 2017). While Facebook is now braving these waters with its
Libra cryptocurrency project, it appears to be doing a remarkably poor
job of navigating their regulatory and political dimensions (see con-
clusion)—particularly if one compares it to, for example, the political
adeptness of Wall Street investment banks at promoting financial in-
novation prior to the global financial crisis (see Wójcik, 2012). Mean-
while, the burgeoning scale of New York’s FinTech industry under-
scores the capacity for the largest financial legal-regulatory and
exchange hubs to become centers of finance-specific software expertise
(Gach and Gotsch, 2016).
In the remainder of the paper, we put the pieces from the previous
two sections together to examine the deepening technological disrup-
tion of asset management. As we show, this disruption closely follows
the pattern seen in other sectors insofar as it exhibits both (1) a digital
platform model of undercutting incumbent cost structures by boosting
various aspects of market efficiency, and (2) the associated digital
platform economy paradox of centralization through democratization.
However, the factors outlined in this section have also resulted in no-
table divergences of the pattern of technological disruption from that
seen in non-financial sectors.
4. The rise of Digital Asset Management Platforms (DAMPs)
Asset management is in many respects a natural fit for the digital
platform economy insofar as managers do not intermediate funds
through their own balance sheets, but rather act as matchmakers be-
tween securities issuers and investors. Until recently, however, this
commonality with the platform economy model has been over-
shadowed by a paradigm of asset manager competition that is essen-
tially the platform model’s antithesis. Rather than acting as low-cost,
transparent conduits between investors and the securities market, this
has entailed managers charging high fees to cover high costs—parti-
cularly highly-paid labor—incurred in an attempt to beat the returns of
their peers (Bernstein, 2005; Malkiel, 2013).
The growing computational intensity of asset management has not
necessarily challenged this traditional business model. “Quant” hedge
funds, for example, essentially just substitute high-cost superstar algo-
rithms for high-cost superstar stock-pickers. In terms of the sheer
amount of money involved, however, this computerized replication of
the traditional high-cost fund management model has increasingly been
overshadowed by the rise of what we dub “digital asset management
platforms” (DAMPs). Rather than using technology to gain a competi-
tive edge within the securities market, DAMPs fundamentally re-
structure the market itself, generating enormous cost savings for in-
vestors, and radically disrupting incumbent business models.
As shown in Fig. 3, there are four key types of DAMP. Oldest are
index (passive) funds, which are very simple algorithmic funds that
minimize investor fees by simply “buying the market.” These funds
piggyback on the high preexisting information arbitrage efficiency of
securities markets to dramatically enhance market functional effi-
ciency. Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are a subset of index funds
which further enhance functional efficiency by restructuring the fund
management process as a two-sided market platform. Lying between
fund managers and the securities market—and blurring the boundary
between managers and the market—are “asset manager support plat-
forms.” These provide services to both active and passive managers
including portfolio risk management, trading optimization and execu-
tion, and regulatory compliance support. In contrast to the simplicity of
index funds, these employ sophisticated data-driven analytics to en-
hance both the fundamental valuation efficiency and functional effi-
ciency of the securities market. Finally, the newest DAMPs are “robo-
advisors,” which in practice largely act as ETF distributors. Robo-ad-
visors bear the closest resemblance to digital platforms outside of fi-
nance in that they simultaneously boost all aspects of market efficiency,
in a complementary manner, in the retail market for fund managers—as
opposed to the securities market itself.
Arguably the oldest exemplar of the digital platform model, either in
or outside of finance, is the index fund. Index funds were conceived as a
thought experiment accompanying the development of the efficient
market hypothesis (EMH). By using the first generation of reasonably
powerful computers to perform empirical statistical analysis (Bernstein,
2005), early EMH researchers identified a conundrum in US securities
markets; the same overcrowding of markets with participants that al-
lowed for newly released information to be rapidly incorporated into
prices, depleted the actionable arbitrage opportunities on which parti-
cipants depended to make money (see Fama, 1995; Malkiel, 2013). The
problem was that searching for and exploiting the residual arbitrage
opportunities was expensive. Net of costs (research, trading, etc.), Ellis
(1975) found that 85% of US fund managers had underperformed the S
&P 500 index—i.e. what could be more or less expected from simply
buying stocks at random—over the previous decade. In Tobin’s (1984)
terminology, this implied that market “information arbitrage effi-
ciency” was vastly higher than “functional efficiency.”
Early EMH claims regarding securities market efficiency are con-
troversial (Tobin, 1984); however, what has been robust is the specific
finding that information arbitrage efficiency is, at least in the US, high
enough to translate into very low asset manager functional efficiency
Fig. 3. Digital Asset Management Platforms (DAMPs).
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(i.e. returns net of costs; Malkiel, 2013). It is this practical observation
that has driven the rise of index funds, which are very simple algo-
rithmic funds that allow investors to passively buy and hold a cross-
section of the entire market—thus eliminating the conventional fund
management apparatus of analysts, traders, etc. Rather than chasing
gross returns at any cost, index funds compete on price, maximizing net
returns by driving down operational overheads to the lowest possible
level, while earning a gross return exactly equal to the market average
(Bernstein, 2005; Malkiel, 2013).
By serving as cheap and transparent vehicles for investors to “buy
the market,” index funds fundamentally transform asset manage-
ment—above all by radically undercutting industry fees and employ-
ment. Unsurprisingly, they were fiercely resisted by the industry when
first proposed by academics, and ultimately would not be pioneered in
the money centers of the northeast, but rather a triangular network
linking the San Francisco Bay area to MIT and the University of Chicago
(Bernstein, 2005). Playing a key role in establishing this network was
an analyst at Smith Barney, John McQuown, who had personal con-
nections to finance researchers at the University of Chicago, and in
1963 began working with an MIT computer scientist to develop algo-
rithmic investing techniques. Their IBM mainframe rentals attracted the
attention of “IBM people, who were always on the lookout for anything
that might demonstrate to prospective customers the versatility and
power of the computer” (Bernstein, 2005, p. 210). Via an IBM executive
forum in San Jose, McQuown was invited to implement algorithmic
investing at San Francisco-based Wells Fargo. Despite opposition from
colleagues alarmed by the “…guys in white smocks with computers
whirring” (Bernstein, 2005, p. 213), McQuown’s project would, with
consultative input from many leading academic finance figures (in-
cluding Eugene Fama), radically transform the bank’s approach to in-
vestment management. Ironically, indexing was adopted “by default,”
as even this simplest algorithmic strategy was “a nightmare” to im-
plement on 1970s-era computers. However, having launched the first
indexed products in 1971, the management of Wells Fargo had by the
end of the 1970s become so impressed with these that they decided to
eliminate conventional active fund management (Bernstein, 2005).
The San Francisco-based operation established by Wells Fargo re-
mains the market leader in indexed products—notwithstanding changes
in ownership from its reorganization as a joint venture with Nikko
Securities in 1990, to its sale to Barclays in 1995, and finally its pur-
chase by BlackRock in 2009. During this time, two additional devel-
opments have impacted index investing. The first was the launch of the
first index mutual fund—open to small retail investors—by Vanguard in
1975. The second was the development of the Exchange Traded Fund
(ETF) in the late-1980s and early-1990s.
Whereas index funds transform the relationship between investors
and securities markets, ETFs transform securities markets themselves by
allowing market indices to be repackaged and traded as securities on
these markets. ETFs are not managed like conventional funds, but are
rather structured as two-sided market platforms. On one side, investors
buy and sell ETF shares on the secondary market; on the other, arbi-
trageurs (e.g. investment banks) exchange specified baskets of secu-
rities with the ETF for “creation units”—i.e. primary market ETF share
issues and repurchases—such that alignment is maintained between (1)
the market value of the ETF’s portfolio and the market value of its
shares, and (2) ETF portfolio composition and the index it tracks. This
platform architecture allows ETFs to achieve exceptionally low opera-
tional costs. ETF are also more liquid than conventional mutual funds,
with intra-day trading possible (Hill et al., 2015).
Although index funds have grown rapidly since the 1970s, it is only
since the global financial crisis that their inflows have become so large
as to reduce the total AUM of active funds (Fig. 4). Since 2007, the
indexed share of US equity fund AUM has nearly tripled to 43%, with
ETFs accounting for approximately 40% of this (Sushko and Turner,
2018). Theoretically, there should be a ceiling on passive fund growth,
as it will eventually impair the information arbitrage efficiency of
markets, creating new arbitrage opportunities for active investors.
However, this has not happened so far. Over 2006–2016, 82% of active
US equity funds underperformed the S&P index benchmark (S&P,
2017), essentially the same as the 85% found by Ellis (1975). Fur-
thermore, similar shares of international funds have underperformed
their respective benchmarks (see S&P, 2017), driving a rapid growth of
passive investing in major securities markets outside of the US (see
Fig. 4 and Sushko and Turner, 2018). As shown in Fig. 5, the cost ad-
vantage of passive over active funds is actually widening in ratio terms.
Indeed, the trend is towards a zero-fee model of index funds and ETFs as
cross-subsidized multi-sided markets—with the first zero-fee funds re-
cently launched by Fidelity—wherein fund investors cease to be paying
customers, and rather become a resource enabling the accumulation of
liquid securities that can be profitably lent to investment banks and
short-sellers (Kaisser, 2018).
The early development of index funds can be attributed to their
ability to use extremely simple algorithms to boost the securities mar-
ket’s relatively low level functional efficiency, by piggybacking on the
market’s much higher level of information-arbitrage efficiency—in
other words, their harnessing of the ready-made “computer” of the
market. However, as computing power has increased, new DAMPs have
emerged that bear a closer resemblance to the stereotyped digital
platform model of employing sophisticated analytics to boost multi-
dimensional market efficiency. Most influential are what can be dubbed
“asset manager support platforms” (Fig. 3), and above all BlackRock’s
Aladdin. This was developed in the late-1980s as an in-house risk
management tool for bond portfolios, and has subsequently expanded
into a comprehensive “operating system”—or as CEO Larry Fink de-
scribes it, “the Android of finance” (Schatzker, 2017)—sold to asset
managers as a cloud-based subscription. According to BlackRock
(2018), “The Aladdin platform combines sophisticated risk analytics
with comprehensive portfolio management, trading and operations
tools on a single platform to power informed decision-making, effective
risk management, efficient trading and operational scale.” Aladdin’s
scale is staggering; from 2013 to 2017 the value of the assets it guided
increased from $11 trillion to $20 trillion (Mooney, 2017). This is
roughly equal to the capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange or
the GDP of the United States. Moreover, Aladdin’s importance to asset
managers appears to be as deep as it is broad; according to the CEO of
New York Life Investors: “Aladdin is like oxygen. Without it we
wouldn't be able to function” (Gara, 2017).
Aladdin’s heart can be described as a data-mining-powered en-
hancement of securities market “fundamental valuation efficiency.”
Reflecting its origins, what remain most important are portfolio risk
management tools (Betz, 2016); as an example of their scope and
power, one BlackRock fund manager recounts how Aladdin told him to
purchase $400 million in US treasuries to offset geopolitical risk from a
North Korean missile test (Gara, 2017). In addition, Aladdin offers tools
which broadly boost asset management “functional efficiency” in areas
from trading optimization and execution (bypassing investment banks)
to regulatory filing preparation. As Aladdin’s scale, scope and sophis-
tication have grown, it has increasingly blurred a number of bound-
aries; notably between human and algorithmic management (see
Section 8), between BlackRock and other asset managers, between the
internal operations of asset managers and the markets in which they
operate, and ultimately, by extension, between BlackRock and the se-
curities market as a whole. With respect to the last, Aladdin’s risk
management algorithms have become so influential as to raise concerns
that they might actually create systemic risks, by inducing correlated
market participant behavior (Economist, 2013b).
The newest area of DAMP development is robo-advising. Rather
than the securities market, this targets the retail market for fund
management products. At the most basic level, robo-advisors serve as
online price comparison tools which steer clients into the lowest cost
investment products; in practice usually ETFs (Kaya, 2017). However,
robo-advisors also typically develop tailor-made product portfolios
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based on client situation and preferences. The sector is still relatively
small, with ca. $140 billion AUM at YE-2017; however, it has been
growing at 50–100% per year (Mason, 2017). As we detail in Section 5,
robo-advisors are increasingly becoming virtual “front offices” for
sprawling vertically integrated DAMP ecosystems.
5. A democratization of the capital market?
A recurrent theme in FinTech discussions is the prediction of in-
dustry decentralization, with incumbent giants seen as threatened by
innovative and nimble start-ups. Arner et al. (2016) go so far as to argue
that the “new era of FinTech [is]…defined not by the financial products
or services delivered but by who delivers them.” In practice, however,
the rise of DAMPs has produced a classic digital platform paradox of
centralization through democratization. On the one hand, ETFs and
robo-advisors offer users dramatically reduced costs, which arguably
level the playing field in favor of smaller investors. Similarly, Aladdin’s
tool package provides smaller institutional (and increasing retail) in-
vestors with capabilities that were formerly available only to their
larger peers. However, DAMPs also exhibit pronounced increasing re-
turns that are producing a winner-take-all concentration of platform
provider market share. Indeed, a remarkably large proportion of the
asset management industry has come under the control of just three
firms—BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street (see Haberly and Wójcik,
2017b; Fichtner et al., 2017). These increasingly act as not only hor-
izontal monopolies/oligopolies within individual DAMP segments, but
vertical monopolies which internalize control of all segments.
Figs. 6 and 7 show the pronounced concentration of index fund and
ETF management, and how this has driven overall asset management
industry concentration. As shown in Fig. 6, active management remains
fragmented, with the 10 largest managers worldwide only having a
27% market share in 2016. However, passive managers, with zero re-
search costs, are able to realize almost unlimited scale economies once
fixed costs are underwritten. The result is snowballing growth wherein
increasing scale allows the largest providers to further reduce costs/
fees, which in-turn attracts additional clients (Haberly and Wójcik,
2017b; Malkiel, 2013; Sushko and Turner, 2018). The “big-three”—-
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—control more than half of the
Fig. 4. Passive percentage of mutual fund and ETF AUM by market, and net flows into active and passive US mutual funds and ETFs, 2000–2018.
Source: Lipper.
Fig. 5. (US) Active and passive mutual fund fees as a percent of AUM, 2000–2016.
Source: Urban, 2018.
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Fig. 6. Worldwide market shares of top-10 managers of active, index (passive) and exchange traded funds (ETFs) in 2016.
Fig. 7. US (top) and worldwide (bottom) asset manager market share change by size category, 2006–2016.
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Fig. 8. Top-10 US Robo-Advisors 2017.
Source: Crigger (2017).
Fig. 9. US (top) and Worldwide (bottom) city-level asset manager headquarters concentration (with and without “big-three” passive manager growth).
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index fund market, while the top-10 firms control two thirds. Con-
centration is even more pronounced in ETFs due to network effects
wherein ETF popularity increases liquidity, which in-turn increases
popularity. The big-three have an 82% market share. Black-
Rock—dubbed the “Amazon of Wall Street” (Gara, 2017)—has a
slightly higher ETF market share, via its iShares products, than Amazon
has in online retail (38% vs 37%; Economist, 2018d).
As shown in Fig. 7 the rapid growth of index funds and ETFs from
2006 to 2016 produced a marked concentration of the asset manage-
ment sector as a whole, at both the US and global level. Virtually all
market share gains went to the big-3 passive managers—BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street—while smaller firms lost market share.
Remarkably, Vanguard alone accounted for more than half of the total
inflows of the entire global fund management industry in 2016
(Economist, 2017). Concentration is even more pronounced once an-
cillary platforms are accounted for; the $20 trillion in assets guided by
Aladdin is three times larger than BlackRock’s directly-managed funds.
Even robo-advising—whose development was spearheaded by start-
ups—has developed a highly concentrated structure, in which robo-
advisors act as virtual “front offices” for vertically integrated DAMP
ecosystems (Mason, 2017). As one analyst puts it, “advice is ultimately
a vehicle to unify control over client wealth” (McLaughlin, 2016). The
second largest index fund and ETF manager, Vanguard, has a 50%
greater market share than the next nine largest robo-advisors combined
(Fig. 8), with its robo-advisor’s recommendations appearing to consist
almost exclusively of its own index funds and ETFs (Reklaitis, 2015). Its
main long-term competitor appears to be BlackRock, which entered
robo-advising through the 2015 purchase of FutureAdvisor as part of a
push to make Aladdin for Wealth Management available for “every
small account” (Schatzker, 2017), including “millions of retail in-
vestors” (Segal, 2016). In 2017, BlackRock expanded into the European
robo-advisor market by purchasing Scalable Capital, “which uses ex-
change-traded funds from BlackRock and others to build low-cost
portfolios for clients” (Jessop and Hunnicutt, 2017). In 2018, it ex-
tended its virtual front-office by investing in “micro-investing” mobile
app Acorns, which “allows customers to automatically invest spare
change from everyday purchases…in exchange-traded funds from
BlackRock and Vanguard ” (Rosenbaum, 2018).
6. The geography of DAMPs I: Command-and-control
Just as technological disruption has been predicted to decentralize
firm-level financial industry structure, many have argued that the in-
dustry’s geographic structure is likely to become more dispersed—or at
least shift away from traditionally dominant centers. Tett (2018), for
example, argues that managers are cutting costs by moving from New
York to lower-cost locations, with this move facilitated by the fact that
“the internet makes it possible to trade securities and do research
anywhere in the world.” Indeed, Alliance Bernstein’s 2018 headquarters
move from New York to Nashville has led to suggestions that even the
command-and-control functions of dominant financial centers are
threatened by technology-driven cost-cutting (Clark and Buhayer,
2018). Furthermore, even if decentralization fails to materialize, this
need not imply the continued leadership of incumbent centers; rather,
as JP Morgan’s CEO recently warned, finance might become the latest
industry to be eaten by Silicon Valley (Dimon, 2014).
In fact, as shown in Figs. 9 and 10, neither of these scenarios is
playing out, at least for command-and-control. Rather, 2006–2016
witnessed a clear tendency towards winner-take-all market share con-
solidation among US asset management centers (Fig. 9a). Combined
with a transatlantic shift of industry dominance from Europe to the US
(see Section 7), this produced a global winner-take-all city-level con-
centration trend (Fig. 9b), with the single largest center, New York,
consuming 36% of worldwide market share gains (increasing its market
share by 66% in ratio terms). The growth of the “big-three” DAMPs has
been the largest driver of this winner-take-all concentration, with their
direct contribution shown by the difference between black and grey
bars in Fig. 9. BlackRock is headquartered in New York, while State
Street and Vanguard are headquartered in the second and third largest
US asset management centers, Boston and Philadelphia. The latter has
enjoyed exceptionally rapid growth attributable to Vanguard (Fig. 10);
a particularly interesting case which underscores that costs can be re-
duced by simply moving to the suburbs (Malvern, PA), while remaining
within a leading financial agglomeration. Notably, although the growth
of the “big-three” DAMPs explains much of the overall geographic
concentration tendency, there is still a large underlying concentration
trend even when the growth of the big-three is removed (grey bars in
Fig. 9).
7. The geography of DAMPs II: Regulation and nationality
Intriguingly, these results suggest that technological disruption is
mostly reinforcing rather than challenging the status quo geography of
asset management. However, the analysis in Section 6 has two limita-
tions. Firstly, it does not account for the potential for city-level trends to
be driven by national-level processes. Secondly, it does not account for
intra-firm organizational trends; particularly the possibility that in-
cumbent centers might be hollowed-out functionally (e.g. in tech-re-
lated employment) even while consolidating their position as com-
mand-and-control centers. In this and the following section we address
these two issues.
Notably, in contrast to digital platforms outside of finance—wherein
Fig. 10. 2006–2016 Change in Worldwide Asset Manager Market Share by Headquarters City.
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competitiveness is often directly linked to technologically-enabled
regulatory arbitrage—DAMP business models do not seem to be pre-
mised on undercutting regulation. To be fair, many have run into reg-
ulatory barriers; when ETFs were first proposed they were incompatible
with the Investment Company Act, and could not be implemented until
lobbying convinced the SEC to change the relevant rules (Hill et al.,
2015). However, where regulatory avoidance itself is the objective, fi-
nancial firms have always had more attractive tools at their disposal
(e.g. pre-crisis shadow banking). In fact, in the context of post-crisis
regulatory tightening, index funds seem to have gained competitive
advantage not from their ability to circumvent tightened regulation, but
rather their ability to leverage economies of scale to comply with it at a
lower unit cost (per-AUM) than active funds.
This does not mean that post-crisis regulatory restructuring has not
impacted asset management, but rather that these impacts have (with
the exception of the point above) been more or less the same for DAMPs
and traditional asset managers. As shown in Figs. 11 and 12, the most
important trend has been a shift from pre-financial crisis dominance of
European banks, to post-crisis dominance of American independent
fund managers. Ironically, the rapid pre-crisis growth of European bank
securities activities appears to have been partly a product of the para-
digm of consolidated supervision established by Basel, which shifted
regulatory primacy to bank home states Following Glass Steagall’s re-
peal, this encouraged the acquisition of American securities firms by
European banking conglomerates with even weaker home capital su-
pervision than American banks—and above all by British and Swiss
“offshore national champion” banks (Haberly and Wójcik, 2018). As
shown in Fig. 11, four of the world’s top-5 asset managers in 2006 were
European banks. Largest was UBS, which owned three of what had been
the top-20 American investment banks in the 1980s (Haberly and
Wójcik, 2018); #2 was Barclays, which owed its size to its ownership of
Wells Fargo’s former index fund division.
Since the crisis this pattern has been reversed, with independent US
fund managers holding four of the top-5 asset manager spots in 2016,
and banks entirely absent from the top-5 (Figs. 11 and 12). Sprawling
European national champion banks were ultimately too large relative to
their home economies to be decisively recapitalized by home govern-
ments in the wake of the crisis (Haberly and Wójcik, 2018). Conse-
quently, they were forced to restore themselves to health through asset
sales—including of asset management arms—with British and Swiss
“offshore national champions” undergoing the largest downsizing
(Figs. 10 and 11). Basel III’s supplementary capital requirements for
“Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFIs) have accelerated
bank divestments of non-core operations, including asset management
arms. Notably, assets under management, as opposed to an institution’s
own balance sheet, are excluded from SIFI criteria—with lobbying by
BlackRock reportedly playing a role in this exclusion (Tracy and
Krouse, 2016)—allowing independent asset managers to retain a rela-
tively lean regulatory footprint compared to other large financial firms.
In practice, most divested bank assets have been purchased by
American independent fund managers (Fig. 12)—mostly as a path-de-
pendent result of there being more American than European in-
dependent fund managers to begin with (due the historical dominance
of universal banks in Europe). Banks have also spun-off asset manage-
ment divisions as standalone managers, with BlackRock as it currently
exists emerging out of both trajectories of restructuring. From 1995,
BlackRock operated as a subsidiary of PNC Financial, before becoming
jointly owned by PNC and Merrill Lynch following its purchase of
Merrill Lynch’s asset management arm. In 2009, BlackRock became the
world’s largest fund manager when a distressed Barclays sold it its index
fund and ETF operation (taking a stake in BlackRock in the process).
Ultimately, all of these bank stakes in BlackRock were divested (apart
from a minority PNC stake), leaving it as an independent manager.
Fig. 11. Top-5 World Asset Managers in 2006 and 2016.
Fig. 12. Asset Management Market Shares by Manager Type, 2006 & 2016.
D. Haberly, et al. Geoforum 106 (2019) 167–181
177
8. The geography of DAMPs III: Functional specialization and
diversification in the Global Financial Network—the case of
BlackRock
What is intriguing about this musical chairs of asset manager par-
entage is that it has little bearing on the functional structure of
DAMPs—the original San Francisco-based index fund operation that
McQuown established at Wells Fargo in the 1970s, for example, has
remained the market leader whether owned by Barclays or BlackRock.
Like the finding that the rise of DAMPs has consolidated rather than
challenged the position of the largest incumbent financial centers, the
paramount importance of regulation in pre- and post-crisis asset man-
ager parentage shifts suggests that the geography of DAMP command-
and-control overwhelmingly reflects their identity as financial firms,
rather than their identity as technology firms. However, this raises the
question of how the latter identity is reflected in their geography. In the
remainder of the paper, we shed light on this by mapping the world’s
largest fund manager, BlackRock, through the lens of the Global
Financial Network framework outlined in Section 3.
In theory, a financial firm could keep one foot in a headquarters
location for regulatory and other reasons, even while (as detailed in
Section 3) redistributing the bulk of its activities centrifugally to spe-
cialized “paper” offshore centers, “virtual” data centers, “back-office
technology centers,” and front-office “regional market centers.” As we
will show, BlackRock’s organization partially reflects such a logic;
however, there are also powerful agglomerative effects within and be-
tween the different functional spheres in Fig. 1, that keep centrifugal
unbundling tendencies in check.
Fig. 13 provides an overview of BlackRock’s geography based on
keyword analysis of all 497 job openings on BlackRock’s website on
April 27, 2018, the domiciles of all BlackRock entities recorded in Orbis
(also see Fig. 14), and the listing exchanges of BlackRock’s iShares fa-
mily of ETFs. City circle areas represent total job openings, while X- and
Y-axis positioning shows job role mixture.3 Y-axis positioning shows the
percentage of jobs associated with software-linked keywords (software,
engineer, scientist, or java); X-axis position shows the percentage of
jobs associated with relational and upper-managerial keywords (“re-
lationship” or “president”). Circle shading indicates whether any iSh-
ares ETFs are listed on a city’s exchanges (black), whether there are
anomalously numerous BlackRock entities compared to employment
(grey), or whether neither of these conditions is met (white).
BlackRock’s employment underscores that it is as much a tech-
nology as a financial firm, with 42% of job listings software-related.
Fig. 13. BlackRock Job Openings by City and Type, April 2018.
Fig. 14. BlackRock internal structure by jurisdiction (entity counts), early 2018.
3 Keyword search lists were refined experimentally to avoid false positives.
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Furthermore, aspects of its organization clearly reflect a technology-
enabled logic of centrifugal geographic specialization and dispersion.
Two back-office technology centers—Budapest and Gurgaon—account
for 26% of software job listings. Edinburgh (with lower costs than
London) also appears to serve as a back-office technology center. This
pattern supports Tett’s (2018) argument that US asset managers are
cutting costs by moving jobs to low-cost locales, even while questioning
the assumption that these must be US locales. Furthermore, BlackRock’s
“brain,” Aladdin, is not housed in a stock exchange co-location center,
but rather a server farm in Wenatchee, Washington, between two hy-
droelectric dams. Finally, BlackRock’s “paper” geography corresponds
tenuously to employment, with Delaware and other offshore jurisdic-
tions of hugely disproportionate importance (Fig. 14).
However, BlackRock also shows countervailing tendencies towards
geographic centralization and functional diversification. BlackRock’s
largest high-tech employment center is Manhattan, which has more
software job openings than Gurgaon and Budapest combined, and is
where BlackRock Solutions, which includes Aladdin, is based.
BlackRock’s largest US offices—New York, San Francisco, and
Wilmington, Delaware—also have strikingly diversified mixtures of
software-intensive and “conventional” financial center functions. This
is congruent with what can be dubbed the “cyborg” investment man-
agement approach of BlackRock. As the head of BlackRock Solutions
puts it: “‘human plus computer’ will always lead to a better result than
computer alone or a human alone” (Segal, 2016). This philosophy is
most important in active management, in which—notwithstanding its
much larger passive AUM—BlackRock has the world’s second largest
market share (Fig. 6). As CEO Larry Fink described a recent equities
team reorganization:
“This wasn’t about machines replacing human beings. Some of our
large-cap products, our core alpha products, were underperforming,
but our quant equity teams were doing quite well…They were
looking at different insights. We wanted a much more holistic
platform where the fundamental teams can work with the model
people. They see things that the model people do not see, and more
importantly we wanted to have the output of the models going to
some of the fundamental people. Cross-fertilization, no different
from what we do in fixed income…We have a venture…in AI, a
whole group of people working on developing computer-based in-
vesting. And that’s truly a computer saying, “Buy this. Sell that.”
[But] We’re not there yet…there’s no true AI yet in investing”
(Schatzker, 2017).
Particularly intriguing is the apparent functional convergence be-
tween BlackRock’s New York and San Francisco offices (the latter built
around Wells Fargo’s pioneering index fund operation inherited via
Barclays). Beyond the technological intensity of operations in New
York, this entails a growing importance of San Francisco-based rela-
tional functions. Both BlackRock’s corporate governance office and
regional head-for-the-Americas are based in San Francisco.
Interestingly, this appears to largely reflect the extent to which the
regional growth of both tech firms, and reservoirs of investible capital
(including the two largest US pension funds in Sacramento), are driving
conventional relational financial center agglomeration. According to
CEO Larry Fink, the head of Americas’ move to San Francisco was
motivated by both the “critical importance to BlackRock of tapping into
innovation on the west coast,” and the fact that “the region is home to
many of our largest clients” (Smith, 2017).
Notwithstanding this convergence, however, the New York secu-
rities market poses a daunting barrier to any pretensions of San
Francisco to become the US financial capital. As detailed by Wójcik
(2011), exchange platform virtualization has overwhelmingly pro-
moted a concentration rather than diffusion of both the technical and
human geographies of the securities market. In the US, nearly all re-
gional exchanges have been absorbed by New York, with most of the US
securities market now located, in a literal sense, in the NYSE Liquidity
Center in the New York suburb of Mahwah, NJ. Notably, this contains
what remains of the formerly San Francisco-based Pacific Stock Ex-
change, which pioneered many areas of online exchange platform de-
velopment. This is consolidated into the NYSE Arca platform, on which
most US ETFs (including BlackRock’s) are listed. BlackRock’s interna-
tional employment is also, with the exception of technology-oriented
back-offices, concentrated in dominant regional exchange hubs—most
importantly London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Sydney. The
distribution of employment among these sites is itself extremely po-
larized, with London accounting for 42% of the total. London accounts
for 77% of BlackRock’s European job openings outside of the back-of-
fice technology centers of Budapest and Edinburgh, suggesting that
virtually all of its European relational and trading activities are con-
centrated here.
Another parallel between BlackRock’s US and international orga-
nization is the entanglement of “paper” and “real” operational geo-
graphies. A securities market is not simply an informational, but also a
contractual and regulatory nexus—as such, the distribution of entities
in Fig. 14 does not fully capture the importance of the major exchange
hubs to BlackRock’s “paper” geography. London, Singapore, and Hong
Kong, in particular, have built their positions as financial centers on
legal-regulatory foundations, particularly by bridging the divide be-
tween “onshore” institutional reputation and “offshore” institutional
flexibility. Notably, BlackRock’s largest incorporation hub, Delaware,
appears to be following a similar developmental trajectory. Wilmington
is BlackRock’s third largest US hiring site, with a diversified mix of
technical and relational-managerial jobs.
9. Conclusion
On August 2, 2018, asset manager shares plunged following an
announcement by the world’s largest active fund manager—Boston-
based Fidelity—that it would be one-upping the traditional low-cost
passive leaders by offering the first zero-fee index funds. Even while
“taking the democratization of investing to a whole new level”
(Bernard, 2018), this final evolution of asset management into a free
service, provided through cross-subsidized platforms, is expected to
intensify an already-ongoing industry shake-out and consolidation
(Kaisser, 2018).
The evidence in this paper underscores the scale of this technology-
driven upheaval; however, it also suggests that the identity and geo-
graphy of digital asset management platform providers has remained,
to a rather counterintuitive extent, aligned with their identity as fi-
nancial firms rather than as technology firms. Indeed, by focusing on
the potential for finance to be disrupted from the outside by tech
startups, many contemporary commentaries appear to have under-
estimated the extent to which the industry is already being transformed
from within. Notably, the San Francisco Bay Area has been a key locus
of technological innovation in asset management for decades, from the
development of index funds in the 1970s, to the expansion of ETFs in
the 90s; however, the most important actors in this innovation have
been major multinational banks and fund managers. Furthermore,
while Bay Area startups have recently spearheaded the development of
robo-advising, these pioneers are increasingly being either out-
competed or purchased by established financial giants. Perhaps most
strikingly, from a geographic standpoint it is the leading incumbent
asset management centers of the US Northeast—and above all New
York—which have been the largest beneficiaries of the tendency to-
wards technology-enabled winner-take-all industry consolidation.
To a large extent, this continuity appears to reflect the fact that both
the informational intensity, and regulatory and organizational fluidity
of the digital platform model are more evolutionary than revolutionary
in finance. What appears to be particularly important, is that financial
innovation has always been entangled in a labyrinth of “paper” legal,
regulatory, and, broadly speaking, political dimensions.
Notwithstanding their unflappable willingness to spearhead not only
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technological, but also regulatory disruption in other industries, the
major Silicon Valley tech giants appear to be rather out of their depth in
this context. Indeed, with the exception of payments, these firms have
mostly been too intimidated by the regulatory complexities of finance
to attempt to enter the sector. Facebook may now be breaking with this
pattern with its foray into cryptocurrencies. However, its ham-handed
approach to dealing with regulators—despite needing to navigate a
minefield of digital privacy and financial regulatory issues spanning
numerous countries (Kharif, 2019)—suggests that the very culture of
disruption that underpins the success of Silicon Valley tech firms may
paradoxically hinder their ability to disrupt financial services. This
makes them poorly placed to compete with financial firms who have no
such problems adopting technological innovations, including by di-
rectly internalizing control over Silicon Valley offices and start-ups.
Entry into finance, it seems, threatens to exacerbate the already
severe tension between the traditional culture of innovation of tech
firms, and the growing political pressure on digital platform providers
to evolve into a role with which financial firms have long been familiar;
i.e. that of state-supervised utilities who can at most use subtle and
roundabout strategies to subvert this supervision. Notably, the most
successful digital asset management platform providers have an even
more utility-like character than most financial firms; as reflected in
their shallow depth of value extraction compared to breadth of financial
market footprint,4 lack of aggressive regulatory arbitrage, and corpo-
rate identities that openly promote “boringness” (see Wee, 2012). In-
deed, BlackRock’s role in the TARP program entailed it acting as more
or less an extension of the Federal Reserve (Lipton and Merced, 2009).
Meanwhile, in the one country where technology giants (e.g. Alibaba)
have achieved a central position in finance—China—their success
seems to be directly linked to their wholehearted adoption of a role as
appendages of Lessig’s (2006) digital “sovereigns of everywhere” (Jia
and Kenny, 2016; Töpfer, 2018).
Most notably, the geography of the world’s leading financial centers
has, for centuries, been perhaps the single most stable and slowly-
changing layer of the world’s economic geography (Arrighi, 1994).
Given the tremendous technological upheavals that have already oc-
curred over this period, there is reason to expect that this geographic
stability will persist.
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